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The search for a balance between the duty of government 
to safeguard its citizens and the individual rights of those pro-
tected is a constant struggle.  One of the key ways in which 
government engages in national security protection is by in-
formation gathering.  National security is by definition a res-
ponsive activity – that is, a government must anticipate before, 
or react after someone else has taken some kind of threatening 
action.  Because of this, acquiring information about other 
people’s doings is essential.  Most certainly through technologi-
cal advancement at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st 
century, information gathering has become a booming govern-
mental business.  Never before were so many opportunities to 
learn things about persons or events and the means to process 
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those data more available.  As a consequence, governments 
adopt information gathering policies and introduce legislation 
by which its agents have to abide, but which can also offer spe-
cific techniques to do their jobs.   
The flip side of the coin is that we have to adapt to the fact 
that there is a substantial amount of information available out 
there, including information about our private lives – informa-
tion we would sometimes like no one else to have.  In general, 
societies directed by the rule of law consider that governments 
should only gather information about us when it is useful to 
reach a goal more important than our personal right to be the 
manager of what gets known about us.  Even then, it is ac-
cepted that the government cannot route through such infor-
mation in any way, and at any cost.  A balance, therefore, must 
be sought between these conflicting interests.  In the last dec-
ades the issue has become more precarious: today information 
is more abundantly available than ever, and societies and their 
governments are faced with wider and more differentiated se-
curity threats.  Finding the difficult balance between our rights 
to collective protection and the right to individual freedom to 
live without governmental interference is a complicated matter 
which continues to evolve.  
In what follows, the special information gathering tech-
niques that a government can or cannot engage in when na-
tional security is at stake are discussed.  They are examined 
primarily from a privacy point of view, but some of the tech-
niques also raise due process questions.  More specifically, the 
way these issues are dealt with in Europe will be discussed.  
The European continent has a long and outstanding history of 
human rights protection through the application of the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the key 
treaty adopted by the Members States of the Council of Europe 
(not to be confused with the European Union), which has grad-
ually assumed the role of a pan-European Bill of Rights.  Logi-
cally, the jurisprudence of its jurisdictional body, the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “the Court”), will be at the 
center of the discussion.  It is not the intention of this contribu-
tion to provide a detailed analysis of the pro’s and con’s of its 
views, but it may provide a first look at how the Court, con-
fronted with national security issues, deals with the protection 
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of certain basic fundamental rights.  First, the phenomenon of 
governments acting in secret will be illustrated (infra Part I).  
Second, the Council of Europe’s political framework on special 
investigation techniques (infra Part II) and the legal principles 
regarding special investigation techniques and fundamental 
rights (infra Part III) are analyzed.  The principles of legal cer-
tainty, judicial control on government action, subsidiarity and 
proportionality are key elements to the issue of privacy protec-
tion.  An examination of a number of special investigation 
techniques interfering with the right to privacy (infra Part IV) 
and the right to a fair trial (infra Part V) will be made, before 
coming to some general conclusions (infra Part VI). 
I.  GOVERNMENTS ACTING IN SECRET 
In general, different types of government agents may want 
to engage in the gathering of information.  They are usually not 
all competent to do so, though.  For example, there are limits 
on the methods tax services can engage in to get information on 
your assets.  When national security is involved, or when a se-
rious crime has been committed, there are often special inves-
tigation techniques available to specific government agencies, 
whether they be a specialized part of the police force or an in-
telligence agency.  According to the Commission for Democracy 
Through Law,1 which is the Council of Europe’s advisory body 
on constitutional matters, there seem to be two schools of 
thought on the question of how those security services should 
be organized.  “In some European countries, the security ser-
vices are independent organizations which are not part of the 
ordinary police force, whereas in other European States the se-
curity services are one of many specialised branches of the gen-
eral police force.”2  
As a consequence, it is not always possible to treat the po-
 
1 Generally referred to as the “Venice Commission.” 
2 Council of Europe, Venice Comm’n., Report: Internal Security Services 
in Europe, 34th Plenary meeting, CDL-INF006 (1998), available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-INF(1998)006-e.asp [hereinafter 
Venice Commission Report]. 
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lice forces and intelligence services separately.  The position of 
organs with special investigation capacities within government 
depends on the constitutional and legal framework of the State.  
The Venice Commission observed that in some European coun-
tries the role of internal security services is limited to the ga-
thering of intelligence and to the subsequent analysis and in-
terpretation of the material.3  Any preventive or enforcement 
functions lie then with the ordinary police or other organs of 
law enforcement.  In other countries, internal security organs 
may have preventive and enforcement functions as well, espe-
cially with regard to actions directed against the security of the 
State.  “Particularly in the countries where the security servic-
es are part of ordinary police, the security service police officers 
are allowed to perform the same acts as other police officers, . . 
.” like tapping telephones.4 
Evidently, it is important to define the notion “special in-
vestigation technique.”  However, there does not seem to be a 
generally accepted legal definition.  In any case, certain ele-
ments are identifiable.  For example, all techniques usually 
called to be special involve some kind of secrecy or deception.  
In practice, a measure is secret when the investigating authori-
ties try to hide what they do from the subject of the technique.  
If the subject knew about the technique being applied to him, 
he would change his plans; if a criminal knew his telephone 
was wiretapped, one can reasonably assume that he would not 
plan further crimes by phone.  As the Venice Commission 
noted, internal security organizations, or police in general, are 
in many cases free from outside administrative interference.5  
That freedom from outside supervision may keep the activities 
in question rather effectively free from surveillance by the me-
dia, the general public, and interested or affected individuals: 
“Secrecy may, indeed, to a certain extent be necessary for the 
success of security operations. It may, however, also harm im-
portant general or individual interests, which makes the regu-
lation of these questions a delicate matter.”6 
 
3 Id. at 9. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 10. 
6 Id. 
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Deceptive investigative techniques on the other hand are 
not applied in hidden conditions, but make the subject believe 
something to be true which in reality is not.  These techniques 
do not just conceal information; they add false information to 
the case.  The core of these techniques is that the authorities 
believe that this intentionally-provoked misunderstanding will 
facilitate prosecution or the gathering of further information.  
If a police officer infiltrates a criminal organization by pretend-
ing to be a criminal, he might get access to interesting informa-
tion. 
II.   COUNCIL OF EUROPE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK REGARDING 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES 
Among the Council of Europe’s political bodies, the Com-
mittee of Ministers (infra Part A) and the Parliamentary As-
sembly (infra Part B), have issued a number of guidelines to 
the Member States concerning special investigation techniques 
and guaranteeing fundamental rights. 
A. The Committee of Ministers 
In 2005, the Council of Europe, through its Committee of 
Ministers, made a recommendation to the Member States on 
special investigation techniques relating to serious crimes, in-
cluding acts of terrorism.  The Committee is mindful of the ob-
ligation on Member States to maintain a fair balance between 
ensuring public safety through law enforcement measures and 
securing the rights of individuals, as enshrined in the provi-
sions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR in particu-
lar.  In the Council of Europe’s recommendation, special inves-
tigation techniques are defined as techniques “applied by the 
competent authorities in the context of criminal investigations 
for the purpose of detecting and investigating serious crimes 
and suspects, aim[ed] at gathering information in such a way 
as not to alert the target persons.”7 
 
7 Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation:  Spe-
cial Investigation Techniques in Relation to Serious Crimes Including 
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The Committee observed that special investigation tech-
niques are numerous, varied, and constantly evolving and that 
their common characteristics are their secret nature and that 
their application could interfere with fundamental rights and 
freedoms.8  Nevertheless, the use of special investigation tech-
niques is considered a vital tool for the fight against the most 
serious forms of crime, including acts of terrorism.  The Com-
mittee also pointed out that the “use of special investigation 
techniques in criminal investigations requires confidentiality 
and that . . . the commission of serious crime, including acts of 
terrorism should, wherever appropriate, be thwarted with se-
cured covert means of operation.”9 
Three general principles are formulated: (1) Member 
States should, in accordance with the requirements of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, define in their national 
legislation the conditions under which the authorities are em-
powered to resort to special investigation techniques; (2) define 
when this is considered necessary in a democratic society and 
is considered appropriate for efficient criminal investigation 
and prosecution; and (3) Member States should “ensure ade-
quate control of the implementation of special investigation 
techniques by judicial authorities or other independent bodies 
through prior authorisation [and] supervision during the inves-
tigation or ex post facto review.”10 
Many of these conditions of use proposed by the Commit-
tee, as will be shown below, are part of the review process of 
the ECtHR.  The Committee noted that special investigation 
techniques should only be used where there is sufficient reason 
to believe that a serious crime has been committed or prepared, 
or is being prepared, by one or more particular persons or an 
unidentified individual or group of individuals.  Proportionality 
between the effects of the use of special investigation tech-
 
Acts of Terrorism, 2, Rec(2005)10 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=838445&BackColorInternet=DBD
CF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864  [he-
reinafter Committee of Ministers, Recommendation]. 
8 Id. at 1-2. 
9 Id. at 7. 
10Id. at 8. 
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niques and the objective that has been identified is essential.  
In this respect, an evaluation should be made in light of the se-
riousness of the offense and the intrusive nature of the specific 
special investigation technique used.  Furthermore, Member 
States need to ensure that their authorities apply less intrusive 
methods if such methods enable the offence to be detected, pre-
vented or prosecuted with adequate effectiveness.  This prin-
ciple adds a condition of subsidiarity.  Member States are 
equally required to “take appropriate legislative measures to 
permit the production of evidence gained from the use of spe-
cial investigation techniques” in court, in order to “safeguard 
the rights of the accused to a fair trial.”11 
B. The Parliamentary Assembly 
In 1998, the Venice Commission issued a report on the 
constitutional relations between internal security services and 
other organs of the State at the request of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).12  It found that: 
[U]ndoubtedly, a variety of internal and external situations may 
arise in which the executive organ of the State must act quickly 
and decisively to protect the fundamental interests of the State 
and society. There must be a consensus that only this need may 
possibly justify the derogation from normal human rights stan-
dards which may sometimes be necessary to ensure the proper 
and effective functioning of National Security Services. It is this 
derogation that provokes the need for particular attention to be 
given to the manner in which these services must be set up, the 
regulation and control of their activities and their proper place 
within the constitutional framework of the country.13  
The Venice Commission recalled that internal security services 
have inbred in them a potential for the abuse of State power – 
as the Commission pointed out, there have been innumerable 
incidences of the most serious violations of human rights com-
 
11 Id. at 9. 
12 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2. 
13 Id. at 4. 
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mitted in the name of internal security.14 “Hence the need for 
the constitutional order to identify what should be the role of 
internal security services within a democratic society, what 
should be their place within the constitutional framework, 
their functions and limitations and what method of control 
should be exercised over their activities.”15 According to the 
Commission, the aim of such services should also be to provide 
protection from possible espionage, terrorism and sabotage 
from foreign powers; to investigate actions which aim at un-
dermining democracy; and to undertake the secret surveillance 
of subversive elements operating within a country’s jurisdic-
tion.16 
In 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly observed that in 
previous years, as a result of the rise in terrorism and crime, 
European societies have felt an increasing need for security.17  
“Some of today’s security threats, such as international orga-
nized crime, international terrorism and arms proliferation, in-
creasingly affect both internal and external security and there-
fore require responses by the services of the security sector, 
preferably co-ordinated and overseen on a European level.”18  
With regard to the security sector, the Council of Europe rec-
ommended a general framework, including the following prin-
ciples: (a) the functioning of intelligence services must be based 
on clear and appropriate legislation supervised by the courts; 
(b) each parliament should have an appropriately functioning 
specialized committee; (c) conditions for the use of exceptional 
measures by these services must be laid down by the law in 
precise limits of time; and (d) under no circumstances should 
the intelligence services be politicized, as they must be able to 
report to policy makers in an objective, impartial, and profes-
sional manner. Any restrictions imposed on the civil and politi-
cal rights of security personnel need to be prescribed by law.19 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 20. 
17 Eur. Consult. Ass. Deb., 23rd Sess. 1713 (June 23, 2005), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1713.htm [herein-
after Parliamentary Assembly Resolution]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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In addition, confidentiality and accountability interests can be 
managed through the principle of deferred transparency, that 
is, by declassifying confidential material after a period of time 
prescribed by law.  Finally, the PACE considered that parlia-
ment must be kept regularly informed about changes which 
could affect the general intelligence policy.20 
With regard to the police forces, the Council recommended 
that (a) in each State a specific legal framework for the func-
tioning and supervision of a democratic police force must be set 
up; (b) given their different mandate and competences, it is 
considered important that legislation distinguishes between se-
curity and intelligence services on the one hand, and law en-
forcement agencies on the other; (c) the police must remain 
neutral and not be subject to any political influence; and (d) po-
lice officers must be given training covering humanitarian 
principles, constitutional safeguards, and standards deriving 
from codes of ethics laid down by international organizations 
such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the Or-
ganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).21  
The PACE stated that it is essential that this sector, which 
traditionally lacks transparency, be overseen by democratic in-
stitutions and subject to democratic procedures:  “Exceptional 
measures in any field must be supervised by parliaments and 
should not seriously hamper the exercise of fundamental con-
stitutional rights.”22 
III.     ECTHR GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES 
As the Venice Commission observed, constitutional norms 
bearing specifically on the internal security services (and the 
techniques they apply) are rare.  In fact, the existence of such 
specific constitutional norms is not necessary.  What is essen-
tial, however, is that legislation or regulations pertaining to in-
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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ternal security organs be in harmony with the Constitution: 
In theory, of course, if the existence of internal security services 
is entrenched in constitutional provisions, built-in constitutional 
guarantees would increase the protection afforded to interests 
which are potentially threatened by the actions of internal secu-
rity services. On the other hand, however, provision in the Con-
stitution might lend undue constitutional legitimacy or status to 
such an institution.23 
For all Member States, the ECHR, in Article 8, provides that 
everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home, and his correspondence.24  Any interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right is prohibited:  
[E]xcept such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.25 
Furthermore, in the words of the European Court of Human 
Rights: 
[T]his paragraph, since it provides for an exception to a right 
guaranteed by the Convention, is to be narrowly interpreted. 
Powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterizing as they 
do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so 
far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institu-
tions.26 
Once an interference with a fundamental right is established 
(infra Part A), it can only be considered legitimate if the meas-
ure is in accordance with the law (infra Part B), serves a legi-
timate goal and is necessary in a democratic society (infra Part 
C). 
 
23 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 6. 
24 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8 ¶ 1, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://con-
ventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. 
25 Id. ¶ 2. 
26 Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 ¶ 42 (1980). 
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A. The Existence of an Interference 
In general, the Court interprets the notion of “interference” 
in the context of privacy rather widely.  The Court in Klass v. 
Germany determined that an individual could submit an appli-
cation concerning secret surveillance measures, without being 
able to point to any concrete measure specifically affecting him.  
The Court held that:  
[I]f this were not so, the efficiency of the Convention’s enforce-
ment machinery would be materially weakened. The procedural 
provisions of the Convention must, in view of the fact that the 
Convention and its institutions were set up to protect the indi-
vidual, be applied in a manner which serves to make the system 
of individual applications efficacious. The Court therefore accepts 
that an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be the 
victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret 
measures or of legislation permitting secret measures, without 
having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to 
him.27  
The Court found it unacceptable that the assurance of the en-
joyment of a right guaranteed by the Convention could be re-
moved by the simple fact that the person concerned is kept un-
aware of its violation.  Thus, the existence of legislation 
allowing secret surveillance in itself amounts to an interference 
with Article 8.28 As will be shown with more detail in infra 
Part IV, however, some government actions do not self-
evidently amount to an interference. 
B. Measure in Accordance with the Law 
In the analysis of the Court, for a measure to be in accor-
dance with the law, it should be foreseeable (infra Part 1), it 
should be accompanied by safeguards against abuse (infra Part 
 
27 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34; see, e.g., Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (2008); Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 
25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 30 (2009). 
28 See, e.g., Ass’n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, 
App. No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 69 (2007). 
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2), and control tools should be provided (infra Part 3). 
 1.    Foreseeability 
The fulfillment of the first condition may seem somewhat 
simple. The ECtHR, however, is rather exigent.  Settled case-
law explains that the expression “in accordance with the law” 
not only requires that the impugned measure should have some 
basis in domestic law, but that it also refer to the quality of the 
law in question.  Referring to the quality of the law requires 
that a measure should be compatible with the rule of law, ac-
cessible to the person concerned, and foreseeable as to its ef-
fects.29 
In the jurisprudence of the Court, “foreseeable” means that 
a rule is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any in-
dividual to regulate his conduct, if necessary after taking ad-
vice.  In addition, the phrase implies that there must be a 
measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary 
interferences by public authorities.  The Court has noted in 
various cases that the risk of arbitrariness is especially evident 
when a power of the executive is exercised in secret.30  Ob-
viously, in the context of secret surveillance measures, the re-
quirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual 
know when the authorities are likely, for example, to intercept 
 
29 See Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 
¶¶ 66-67 (1984); Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 
¶¶ 50-51 (1987); Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 29 
(1990); Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 30 (1990); 
Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94,  Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 63-64 (1998); Va-
lenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95,  Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 46 (1998); 
Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 50-56 (2000); Ro-
taru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55 (2000); Doerga v. 
Netherlands, App. No. 51210/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45 (2004); Antunes Rocha v. 
Portugal, App. No. 64330/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 66-67; Van der Velden v. Neth-
erlands, App. No. 29514/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 2 (2006); Weber v. Germany, App. 
No. 54934/00,  Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 (2006);  Dumitru Popescu v. Romania, App. 
No. 71525/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 (2007); Ass’n for Eur. Integration and Hu-
man Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 71 (2007); Liberty 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 59-62 (2008); S. v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04,  Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95 (2008); Bykov v. 
Russia, App. No. 4378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 76 (2009); Iordachi v. Moldova, 
App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 37-39 (2009). 
30 See cases cited supra note 29. 
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his communications so that he can adapt his conduct according-
ly.  Nevertheless, “the law must be sufficiently clear in its 
terms to give [citizens] an adequate indication as to the cir-
cumstances in which and the conditions on which public au-
thorities are entitled to resort to such covert measures.”31 
 2.     Safeguards Against Abuse 
In addition, adequate and effective safeguards against 
abuse must exist.  The Court pointed out that anything less 
would be unacceptable; a system of secret surveillance designed 
to protect national security entails the risk of “undermining or 
even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it.”32  In 
the Klass case of 1978, which was the earliest landmark judg-
ment, the Court noted that it: 
[M]ust be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is 
adopted, there exist adequate and effective guarantees against 
abuse. This assessment has only a relative character: it depends 
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope 
and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for 
ordering such measures, the authorities competent to permit, 
carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy 
provided by the national law.33 
The Court then found a number of legal limitations to be in 
accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR.  In the German legisla-
tion at stake, privacy-restricting measures were confined to 
cases in which there were factual indications for suspecting a 
person of planning, committing, or having committed, certain 
serious criminal acts.  Among other requirements, the applica-
tion of the measures was limited by a subsidiarity clause, and 
even then the surveillance could cover only the specific suspect 
or his presumed contact-persons.  Exploratory or general sur-
veillance was not permitted by the contested legislation.  Un-
 
31 Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26 (2000) 
(quoting Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 ¶ 
67 (1984)).  
32 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 214 ¶ 49. 
33 Id. ¶ 50. 
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der the same legislation, the Court found that surveillance 
could be ordered only on written application giving reasons, 
and such an application could be made only by the head, or his 
substitute, of certain services.34  Accordingly, “there exist[ed] 
an administrative procedure designed to ensure that measures 
were not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and 
proper consideration.”35 
Starting with Klass at the end of the 1970s, the Court has 
steadily outlined a number of general principles regarding 
State responsibility regarding secret surveillance measures.  In 
recent cases, the Court has grown more exigent on the quality 
of the law, emphasizing its effectiveness in practice, rather 
than its theoretical merits.  For example, the Court determined 
in the 2000 Rotaru case against Romania that although data on 
citizens may be gathered, recorded and archived, the kind of in-
formation gathered has to be defined, as well as the categories 
of people that may be subjected to it, the circumstances that 
warrant surveillance, and the procedure that needs to be fol-
lowed.36  The framework in existence and its application at the 
time was deemed largely incomplete.37 
Overall, the Court, through its case-law on secret meas-
ures of surveillance, has developed a set of minimum safe-
guards that should be statutorily introduced in order to avoid 
abuses of power.  The safeguards should include: the nature of 
the offenses that may give rise to a surveillance order; catego-
ries of people liable to be subject to any such measure; a limit 
on its duration; the procedure to be followed for examining; us-
ing and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken 
when communicating the data to other parties; and the cir-
cumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or de-
stroyed.38  Finally, “the body issuing authorizations should be 
 
34 Id. ¶ 51. 
35 Id. 
36 See Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 449  ¶¶ 57-
58 (2000). 
37 Id. ¶¶ 62-63. 
38 Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2009) 
(quoting Weber, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95). See Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 
Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 34 (1990); Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. H.R. 
Rep. ¶ 35 (1990). 
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independent and there must be either a form of judicial control, 
or control by an independent body over the issuing body’s activ-
ity.”39 
With regard to who should design that legal framework, 
the ECtHR noted that:  
Since the implementation in practice of measures of secret sur-
veillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the indi-
viduals concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary to 
the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to 
be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the 
law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on 
the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with 
sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the 
measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection 
against arbitrary interference.40 
The Venice Commission reached the same conclusion, stating: 
[T]he regulation of internal security services can only be made ef-
fective by having specific legislation. If the position is regulated 
by administrative practice, however well adhered to, it will never 
provide the guarantees required by law. Being an administrative 
practice, it can be changed at any time and thereby clarity as to 
the scope or the manner in which the discretion of the authorities 
is exercised would undoubtedly be lacking.41 
 
39 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 40 (quoting Dumitru Po-
pescu, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 70-73); see Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App. No. 
27671/95, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483 ¶ 46 (1998); Ass’n for Eur. Integration and 
Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 76-77 (2007); 
Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008). 
40 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68 
(1984); Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 51 (1987); 
Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (2000); Rotaru, 
App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55 (2000); Liberty v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008). The Court pointed out the same 
for delegation to the judiciary. See Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, Eur. 
H.R. Rep. ¶ 29 (1990); Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 
30 (1990); Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00,  Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 (2006); 
Bykov v. Russia, App. No. 4378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2009); Iordachi, App. 
No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 39 (quoting Weber, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 94). 
41 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 20. 
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 3.     Control of Surveillance 
The Venice Commission concluded that legislative control 
over the actions of intelligence services remains an essential 
means of ensuring that they operate exclusively in the national 
interest for the realization of democracy and the rule of law.42  
Important issues are: an actor's competence to exercise that 
control (Infra Part a); the way the control process should be 
conducted before and during the surveillance measure (Infra 
Part b); and possibilities of a citizen to question the legality of a 
surveillance measure afterwards (Infra Part c). 
a.  Control Actors 
In general, the European Court considers that in a field 
where abuse is potentially so easy and could have such harmful 
consequences for democratic society, it is in principle desirable 
to entrust supervisory control to a judge.43  The Venice Com-
mission equally promotes judicial control.44  The rights of indi-
viduals cannot be adequately protected if the acts of such insti-
tutions are not made susceptible to judicial review. 
[W]hereas it would be unrealistic to require their activities – if 
they are to be effective – to be fully transparent at all times, it is, 
however, expected that internal security services be accountable 
for their acts and activities within the legal framework in which 
they operate. To that extent they must be transparent in the 
sense that their actions should be verifiable and subject to control 
to establish whether they had correctly exercised their functions 
and powers intra vires. This control must be a judicial one either 
by an ad hoc judicial authority, or by the ordinary courts. This is 
especially so where fundamental rights are involved.45 
Nevertheless, the European Court admitted that control can 
take other forms.  A parliamentary board or a specific supervi-
sory commission independent of the authorities carrying out 
the surveillance, and “vested with sufficient powers and compe-
tence to exercise an effective and continuous control,” are ac-
 
42 Id. at 6. 
43 Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 ¶ 56 (1980). 
44 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 11-13. 
45 Id. at 25. 
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ceptable as well.  The Court emphasized its democratic charac-
ter, “which can be reflected in a balanced membership of the 
parliamentary board.”  In those circumstances, such supervi-
sory bodies may “be regarded as enjoying sufficient indepen-
dence to give an objective ruling.”46  In the Leander case of 
1987, the Court repeated that it: 
[A]ttaches particular importance to the presence of parliamenta-
rians on the National Police Board. . . . The parliamentary mem-
bers of the board, who include members of the Opposition, partic-
ipate in all decisions regarding whether or not information 
should be released to the requesting authority. In particular, 
each of them is vested with a right of veto, the exercise of which 
automatically prevents the Board from releasing the information 
. . . . This direct and regular control over the most important as-
pect of the register – the release of information – provides a ma-
jor safeguard against abuse.47  
The Venice Commission on its turn noticed the existence of 
supplemental parliamentary supervision.48 
An overall control over the system of secret surveillance 
being entrusted to the executive, such as the Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs, and not to independent bodies, is not acceptable to 
the Court.49  In its policy observations, the Venice Commission 
also found that internal security organs are normally super-
vised by their hierarchical superiors, at the top level by the ap-
propriate government Minister or even by the Prime Minister 
or the Head of State.  “The supervision often includes regular 
reports from the security services.  It may even include the 
need for a supervising person or body to authorize the com-
mencement of investigations in individual cases.”50  Neverthe-
less, fundamental freedoms can never be properly guaranteed 
if domestic security surveillances are conducted within the ab-
 
46 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56. 
47 Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶ 65 
(1987). 
48 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 14. 
49 Ass’n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 87 (2007). 
50 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 14. 
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solute discretion of the executive: 
It is an established fact that where there is unreviewed executive 
discretion this may very well lead to imposing pressure in order 
to obtain incriminating evidence and thereby overlook potential 
invasions of privacy. Thus, the services cannot operate uncon-
trolled. There have been various instances where security servic-
es have attempted to influence the political scene in the countries 
in which they operate.51 
b.  A Priori and Ad Hoc Control 
Review of surveillance may intervene at three stages: 
when the surveillance is first ordered, while it is being carried 
out, or after it has been terminated. The Court stated that in 
the first two stages, the very nature and logic of secret surveil-
lance dictate that the surveillance and the accompanying re-
view should take place without the individual’s knowledge: 
Consequently, since the individual will necessarily be prevented 
from seeking an effective remedy of his own accord or from taking 
a direct part in any review proceedings, it is essential that the 
procedures established should themselves provide adequate and 
equivalent guarantees safeguarding the individual’s rights. In 
addition, the values of a democratic society must be followed as 
faithfully as possible in the supervisory procedures if the bounds 
of necessity, within the meaning of Article 8(2), are not to be ex-
ceeded.52 
According to the Court, the rule of law implies that an interfe-
rence with an individual’s rights by the executive authorities 
should be subject to an effective control, assured by the judi-
ciary – at least in the last resort.  Judicial control offers the 
best guarantee of independence, impartiality, and a proper pro-
cedure.53  In the analysis of the Venice Commission, the fact 
that many intelligence gathering actions are carried out clan-
destinely, makes it impractical to rely on judicial control at the 
 
51 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 20. 
52 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55. 
53 Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449 ¶ 59 
(2000). In the Antunes Rocha case, the Court reiterated this idea, omitting 
however the reference to the judiciary as key player. Antunes Rocha v. Por-
tugal, App. No. 64330/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 76 (2005). 
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initiative of the person who has been the target of an operation 
of the security services.54  The Venice Commission stated fur-
ther: 
As such a judicial control could be seen as a vital safeguard of the 
rights of the individual, it might be advisable to make a recom-
mendation that operations of the security services that involve 
intrusions into rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution 
or the European Convention on Human Rights can only be car-
ried out under judicial control.55 
c. A Posteriori Control 
The Venice Commission observed with regard to a posteri-
ori control that a proper balance must be struck between the 
interests of the individual and the interests of society at large.  
As an overriding principle: 
[T]he courts should have jurisdiction to determine whether the 
actions complained of were within the powers and functions of 
the internal security services as established by law. Within the 
limitations laid down by law, the court should have the right to 
determine whether there was undue harassment of the individu-
al or abuse of administrative discretion in his or her regard. 
Judicial review of the executive acts, even with proper safeguards 
essential in the circumstances to ensure the integrity of the 
State, should not be unduly withheld.56 
In the view of the ECtHR: 
[A]s regards review a posteriori, it is necessary to determine 
whether judicial control, in particular with the individual’s par-
ticipation, should continue to be excluded even after surveillance 
has ceased. Inextricably linked to this issue is the question of 
subsequent notification, since there is in principle little scope for 
recourse to the courts by the individual concerned unless he is 
advised of the measures taken without his knowledge and thus 
able retrospectively to challenge their legality.57 
 
54 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 13. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57. 
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One of the questions the Court already had to answer is 
whether it is feasible in practice to require subsequent notifica-
tion in all cases.  Obviously, the activity or danger against 
which a particular series of surveillance measures is directed 
may continue after the suspension of those measures.  In the 
opinion of the Court, subsequent notification to each individual 
affected might well jeopardize the long-term purpose that orig-
inally prompted the surveillance.58  Furthermore, such notifi-
cation might serve to reveal the working methods and fields of 
operation of the intelligence services and even possibly to iden-
tify their agents.  The conclusion of the Court in Klass was that 
not informing the individual once surveillance has ceased can-
not itself be incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.59  How-
ever, in the 2008 Ekimdzhiev case the Court ruled that legisla-
tion excluding such notification in any case and at any time (for 
reasons of classification of information), is intolerable.60  Legis-
lation excluding notification would mean that a target of sur-
veillance may be unable to seek redress for unlawful interfe-
rences with the Article 8 rights; the person would not know 
that they had been monitored unless there was a leak of infor-
mation or the person was subsequently prosecuted based on 
the gathered information.61 
C.  Measures Necessary in a Democratic Society 
In the context of national security measures, the second 
condition does not pose a problem; public safety or the econom-
ic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, 
and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are de-
scribed in the Convention as legitimate goals for a privacy in-
trusion.62  The measures, however, must also be necessary in 
 
58 Id. ¶ 58. 
59 Id. 
60 Ass’n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 (2007). 
61 Id. ¶ 91. 
62 Article 8 ¶ 2 of the ECHR provides the possibility to restrict privacy in 
the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of 
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8 ¶ 2, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 
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today’s democratic society.  The Court emphasized that, “while 
the Court recognizes that intelligence services may legitimately 
exist in a democratic society, it reiterates that powers of secret 
surveillance of citizens are tolerable under the Convention only 
in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic 
institutions.”63 
In accordance to settled case-law, an interference will be 
considered necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate 
aim if it answers a so-called “pressing social need” and, in par-
ticular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and 
if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it 
are “relevant and sufficient.”64  The Venice Commission, hav-
ing accepted that the unorthodox means by which internal se-
curity services must be allowed to operate can have a negative 
effect, 65 stated:  
[I]t is imperative that these extraordinary measures and restric-
tions of fundamental rights and liberties should be proportionate 
to the danger involved. The same principle applies when the in-
ternal security services intervene out of necessity in the defense 
of the State in the political or democratic process. These services 
are only authorized to intervene in this manner as long as the 
danger their action is meant to prevent persists and with the 
minimum involvement for a definite and determinate purpose.66 
While the national authorities make the initial assessment 
in all these respects, the final evaluation of whether the inter-
ference is necessary remains subject to review by the Court for 
 
U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/glo-
bal/ilo/law/coeprot.htm#Article%208. 
63 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 42; see also Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 
28341/95, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 449 ¶ 47; Antunes Rocha v. Portugal, App. No. 
64330/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 66 (2005). 
64 See, e.g., Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
13585/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶59 (1991); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 13166/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50 (1991); Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 
15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 31 (1994).  In relation to Article 8, see, e.g., Hertel 
v. Switzerland, App. No. 25181/94), Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 46 (1998); S. v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 101 (2008). 
65 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 26. 
66 Id. 
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conformity with the requirements of the Convention.  A certain 
margin of appreciation is nevertheless left to the competent na-
tional authorities in this assessment.  The breadth of this mar-
gin varies, depending on a number of factors including the na-
ture of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the 
individual, the nature of the interference and the object pur-
sued by the interference.  The margin will tend to be narrower 
where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective 
enjoyment of intimate or key rights.  Equally, where a particu-
larly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is 
at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted.  
"Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member 
States, either as to the relative importance of the interest at 
stake or as to how best to protect it, the margin will be wid-
er."67 
Occasionally, the Court considers not only the qualitative 
aspects of legislation, but also statistical evidence, such as the 
amount of times a government has used secret investigation 
during a certain period of time in relation to its population 
numbers, how many of these actions were used in criminal pro-
ceedings afterwards, and so on.  For example, the Court noted 
in the Ekimdzhiev case that: 
[M]ore than 10,000 warrants were issued over a period of some 
twenty-four months, from 1 January 1999 to 1 January 2001, and 
that number does not even include the tapping of mobile tele-
phones (for a population of less than 8,000,000). Out of these, on-
ly 267 or 269 had subsequently been used in criminal proceedings 
. . . .  Additionally, in an interview published on 26 January 2001 
the then Minster of Internal Affairs conceded that he had signed 
4,000 orders for the deployment of means of secret surveillance 
during his thirteen months in office . . . .  By contrast, in Malone . 
. ., the number of the warrants issued was considered relatively 
low (400 telephone tapping warrants and less than 100 postal 
warrants annually during the period 1969-79, for more than 
26,428,000 telephone lines nationwide). These differences are 
telling, even if allowance is made for the development of the 
means of communication and the rise in terrorist activities in re-
cent years. They also show that the system of secret surveillance 
in Bulgaria is, to say the least, overused, which may in part be 
 
67 S., App. No. 30562/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 102. 
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due to the inadequate safeguards which the law provides.68 
As mentioned above, the Court previously held with regard to 
secret surveillance that national authorities enjoyed a fairly 
wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achiev-
ing the legitimate aim of protecting national security.69  The 
criteria concerning foreseeability, safeguards and control seem 
to indicate, however, that today this margin has become li-
mited.  In some national security cases not relating to Article 8, 
the Court considers that there is no margin of appreciation at 
all.70 
 
IV.     SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES INTERFERING WITH 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
When it comes to privacy, it is inherent to the nature of the 
privacy reducing measures that national security may not have 
been affected yet.  The government’s goal is to prevent any ac-
tual threat of being carried out.  Obviously, any such danger to 
national security will have to be proven, or at least made credi-
ble, by facts. In what follows, a number of investigation tech-
niques are examined in more detail.  These involve systematic 
or intensified observations (infra Part A), the interception and 
opening of mail correspondence (infra Part B), the identifica-
tion, tracking and wiretapping of telecommunication (infra 
Part C), and the keeping of data (infra Part D).  The last two 
techniques, to the application of which governments seem to be 
increasingly inclined, will be discussed with more attention.  As 
explained above, every State has its own legal framework to 
 
68 Ass’n for European Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. 
No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 92 (2008). 
69 See Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶ 59 
(1987). See also Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No.  8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 14 ¶ 81 (1984). 
70 The Court has found, for example, that even when confronted with al-
leged terrorist activities, there is no margin of appreciation in the application 
of the principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR. See Chahal v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996); see also 
Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008). 
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organize the competences of the actors concerned.  
A. Systematic or Intensified Observations 
Within the ECHR framework, the justifiability of intensi-
fied observations depends on what particular actions have been 
undertaken.  The systematic retention of information regarding 
a person’s whereabouts and doings must be in accordance with 
the abuse safeguards described above.  When observations are 
conducted (and the results stored) with some kind of technical 
equipment, the principles of communication taps or private in-
formation data banks may apply (infra Parts C and D).  Ob-
viously, physically searching private dwellings or property con-
stitutes a serious interference with a person’s private life, and 
a fortiori when the person concerned is unaware.  As always, 
the European Court attaches great importance to preceding 
judicial control.71  In the Murray case, the Court found that: 
[I]t remains to be determined whether [the searches] were neces-
sary in a democratic society and, in particular, whether the 
means employed were proportionate to the legitimate aim pur-
sued. In this connection it is not for the Court to substitute for 
the assessment of the national authorities its own assessment of 
what might be the best policy in the field of investigation of ter-
rorist crime.72 
Thus, a certain margin of appreciation in deciding what 
measures to take both in general and in particular cases should 
be left to the national authorities.  The Court continued by 
reaffirming the responsibility of an elected government in a 
democratic society to protect its citizens and its institutions 
against the threats posed by organized terrorism and to the 
special problems involved in the arrest and detention of per-
sons suspected of terrorist-linked offenses.73  It opined that 
"[t]hese two factors affect the fair balance that is to be struck 
between the exercise by the individual of the right guaranteed 
to him or her under paragraph 1 of Article 8 and the necessity 
 
71 See, e.g., Chappell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10461/83, 12 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 1 ¶ 59 (1989). 
72 Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14310/88, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 193 
¶ 90 (1994). 
73 Id. ¶ 91. 
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under paragraph 2 for the State to take effective measures for 
the prevention of terrorist crimes."74 
Since there existed evidence resulting in a genuine and honest 
suspicion that the applicant committed a terrorist linked crime, the 
Court in Murray accepted that it was reasonable under the circums-
tances to search the target’s house.75  In general, the existence of 
specific legislation dealing with situations in which officers enter 
private places without conducting a normal house search is appro-
priate.  With regard to cases involving the planting of electronic 
devices and the use of video cameras to observe the activities of 
persons in private places, the Venice Commission noted in 1998 
that the introduction of such legislation would ensure that, while 
the security services are provided with the necessary tools to gather 
information about serious crime and terrorism, they do not exceed 
their powers.76 
In any case, authorities will have to be careful, even when 
conducting observations in a public environment.  According to the 
ECtHR, there is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even 
in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life.  
It cannot be ignored that a person’s private life may extend outside 
a person’s home or private premises.77  In the case of P.G. and 
J.H. v. United Kingdom, the Court added, however, that: 
Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally 
involve themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or 
reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable expectations 
as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily con-
clusive, factor. A person who walks down the street will, inevita-
bly, be visible to any member of the public who is also present. 
Monitoring by technological means of the same public scene (for 
example, a security guard viewing through closed circuit televi-
sion) is of a similar character.78 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. ¶ 92. 
76 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 21. 
77 Perry v. United Kingdom, App. No. 63737/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 36 
(2003). 
78 P.G. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57 (2001). 
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B.  The Interception and Opening of Mail Correspondence 
Obviously, the Court has dealt with protection of corres-
pondence problems.  In a national security context, it paid par-
ticular attention to the mail traffic between a prisoner and his 
attorney.  In Campbell, the Court found that the prison author-
ities may open a letter: 
[W]hen they have reasonable cause to believe that it contains an 
illicit enclosure which the normal means of detection have failed 
to disclose. The letter should, however, only be opened and 
should not be read. Suitable guarantees preventing the reading 
of the letter should be provided, e.g. opening the letter in the 
presence of the prisoner. The reading of a prisoner’s mail to and 
from a lawyer, on the other hand, should only be permitted in ex-
ceptional circumstances when the authorities have reasonable 
cause to believe that the privilege is being abused in that the con-
tents of the letter endanger prison security or the safety of others 
or are otherwise of a criminal nature. What may be regarded as 
“reasonable cause” will depend on all the circumstances but it 
presupposes the existence of facts or information which would sa-
tisfy an objective observer that the privileged channel of commu-
nication was being abused.79 
In the Erdem case, the Court accepted that it is necessary in a 
democratic society, for reasons of national security, to monitor 
the correspondence of prisoners specifically suspected of be-
longing to a terrorist organization.  The Court stressed that 
"the monitoring power was vested in an independent judge who 
had to be unconnected with the investigation and was under a 
duty to keep the information obtained confidential."80  For 
these reasons, the interference was considered falling in the 
margin of appreciation of the State.81  Having interception 
warrants issued by courts would, according to the Venice 
Commission, also serve to dismiss any objection to introducing 
the transcripts as admissible evidence in a prosecution case.82 
C.  Identification, Tracking and Wiretapping of 
 
79 Campbell v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 233 ¶ 48 (1992). 
80 Erdem v. Germany, App. No. 38321/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 67 (2001). 
81 Id. ¶ 69. 
82 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 21. 
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Telecommunication 
Wiretapping is a very invasive investigation method be-
cause it allows police officers to listen to citizens’ private con-
versations.  It is no surprise that the issue has provoked a large 
number of applications to the Court, resulting in a rather diffe-
rentiated analysis.  In the Klass case mentioned above, the 
Court noted the technical advances made in the field of espio-
nage and, correspondingly, of surveillance.83  Most importantly, 
due to the development of terrorism in Europe in recent years, 
“democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by 
highly sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism, with 
the result that the State must be able, in order effectively to 
counter such threats, to undertake the secret surveillance of 
subversive elements operating within its jurisdiction.”84 
For that reason, the Court accepted that the existence of 
legislation granting powers of secret surveillance of telecom-
munications is, under exceptional conditions, a necessary 
evil.85  The domestic legislature enjoys certain discretion; the 
Court does not consider itself to be a substitute for the assess-
ment by the national authorities of what might be the best pol-
icy. Nevertheless the Court stressed that: 
[T]his does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unli-
mited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to se-
cret surveillance. The Court, being aware of the danger such a 
law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the 
ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may 
not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, 
adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.86 
The principles regulating telephone tapping apply equally 
to the use of radio-transmitting devices, which are, in terms of 
the nature and degree of the intrusion involved, virtually iden-
tical to that of telephone tapping.87  Not all telecom follow-ups, 
 
83 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 48. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. ¶ 49. 
86 Id. 
87 Bykov v. Russia, App. No. 4378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 79 (2009). 
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however, amount to such wiretapping.  In the Malone case of 
1984, the Court found that the registering of numbers dialed on 
a particular telephone, and the time and duration of each call 
by its very nature to be distinguished from the interception of 
communications, which is undesirable and illegitimate in a 
democratic society unless justified.88  Hence, the measures tak-
en in order to prevent arbitrariness are not under the same 
scrutiny as in cases of the actual tapping of conversations.  
"The Court does not accept, however, that the use of that data . 
. . whatever the circumstances and purposes, cannot give rise 
to an issue under Article 8.”89  The retention and use of data 
will be further discussed below (cf. infra Part D). 
As a matter of principle, in the Huvig and Kruslin judg-
ments of 1990, the Court considered that “[t]apping and other 
forms of interception of telephone conversations . . . must . . . be 
based on a ‘law’ that is particularly precise.  It is essential to 
have clear, detailed rules on the subject, especially as the tech-
nology available for use is continually becoming more sophisti-
cated.”90  The domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its 
terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circums-
tances in which, and the conditions on which, public authorities 
are empowered to resort to any measures.91  Nevertheless, and 
contrary to the legislation of some Member States, the proac-
tive ordering of a telephone tap (before any crime is committed) 
 
88 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 ¶ 84 
(1985) 
89 Id.; see, e.g., P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 550 ¶¶ 42-47 (2001). 
90 Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 32 (1990); 
Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 33 (1990); 
Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 ¶ 72 (1999); 
See Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483 
¶ 46 (1999); Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 
62 (2008) (quoting Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 
(2006)); Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2009) 
(quoting Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 (2006)). 
91 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (quoting Weber, App. 
No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93); See Huvig, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 29; 
Kruslin, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 30; Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 ¶ 64; Khan 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26 (2000) (quoting 
Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 ¶ 67). 
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is not necessarily a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.92  The 
Court noted in the Lüdi case that the tap was "aimed at the 
'prevention of crime,'" and it had "no doubt as to its necessity in 
a democratic society."93  According to the Court, to assess the 
legitimacy of a wiretap, a distinction has to be made between 
two stages of interception: the authorization of the measure 
(infra Part 1) and the control during the surveillance process 
(infra Part 2).94 
1.      Wiretap authorization
In the first stage, the following general conditions to justify 
secret surveillance must be fulfilled: (1) the applicable legisla-
tion should provide the nature of the offenses which may give 
rise to the tapping; (2) a definition of the categories of people 
possibly subject to the measure; (3) limits on its duration; (4) 
the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing 
the data; (5) the precautions to be taken when communicating 
the data to others; and (6) the circumstances in which record-
ings or tapes are erased or destroyed.95  In the context of tele-
phone tapping, this means a definition of the categories of 
people liable to have their telephones tapped by judicial order 
and the nature of the offenses which may give rise to such an 
order.  The absence of an obligation to set a limit on the dura-
tion of telephone tapping, specifications of the procedure for 
 
92 The Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, does not allow 
it. Article 53 of the ECHR provides that nothing in the Convention “shall be 
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fun-
damental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Con-
tracting Party . . . .” As a consequence of this maximization clause, in prin-
ciple, the more protective framework will be applied. 
93 Lüdi v. Switzerland, App. No. 12433/86, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 173 ¶ 39 
(1992). 
94 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 41; see also Ass’n for Eur. 
Integration & Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 
84 (2007). 
95 Huvig, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 34; Kruslin, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 
35; Valenzuela Contreras, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483 ¶ 46; see also Iordachi, App. 
No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39; Bugallo v. Spain, App. No. 58496/00, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 30 (2003). 
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creating the interception reports, and of the “precautions to be 
taken in order to communicate the recordings intact and in 
their entirety for possible inspection by the judge and by the 
defence,” is considered problematic.96  According to the Court, 
“[t]he requirement that the effects of the 'law' [should] be fore-
seeable means, in the sphere of monitoring telephone commu-
nications, that the guarantees stating the extent of the authori-
ties’ discretion and the manner in which it is to be exercised 
must be set out in detail in domestic law so that it has a bind-
ing force which circumscribes the judges’ discretion in the ap-
plication of such measures.”97 
Indeed, the Court stresses the value of a decision by an in-
vestigating judge or, for example, by the president of the in-
dictment division of the court, who is an independent judicial 
authority.98  Interceptions ordered only by the public prosecu-
tion, without any a priori control possibility by a judge, do not 
meet the required standards of independence.99  “[T]he Court 
considers it [equally] necessary to stress that telephone tapping 
is a very serious interference with a person’s rights and that 
only very serious reasons based on a reasonable suspicion that 
the person is involved in serious criminal activity should be 
taken as a basis for authorising it.”100  The Venice Commission 
advised the same stating that a wiretap should only be in-
stalled when the judge is satisfied that there is imminent dan-
ger of a serious crime and that more routine methods of inves-
tigation would be unlikely to succeed.101  Provisions should be 
made for the transcripts to be handed first to the judge, who 
then releases to the investigating services the portions that he 
deems relevant to the investigations being carried out.102  As it 
appears, the so-called “John Doe” taps provided for in section 
 
96 Id. 
97 Valenzuela Contreras, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483 ¶ 60. 
98 See Huvig, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 33; Kruslin, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 
¶ 34; Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 ¶ 72 
(1999), 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 ¶ 72; Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (2000). 
99 Dumitru Popescu, Popescu v. Romania, App. No. 71525/01, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶¶ 70-73 (2007). 
100 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51. 
101 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 21. 
102 Id. 
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206 of the U.S. Patriot Act (expired in principle in 2009), being 
anonymous regarding either the person or the place monitored, 
would not meet the requirements of the European Court.  Its 
accordance with the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
can, in fact, equally be questioned. 
2.      Wiretap Contro
With regard to the second stage, control over the surveil-
lance should be put under control of a judge or another inde-
pendent body.103  In the total absence of any effective judicial 
control policies, the Court is not impressed by a (theoretical) 
resort to Parliament.104  An investigating judge whose role is 
limited to issuing interception warrants and deciding on the 
storage of the tapes and transcripts is not enough if the law 
fails to make a provision for acquainting him with the results 
of the surveillance, and does not require him to determine if 
the requirements of the law have been complied with.  Leaving 
that competence to the prosecutor’s office is not sufficient, cer-
tainly not considering that the situations protected would then 
only be those attached to criminal proceedings, neglecting any 
surveillance outside of that scope.105  Delegating the task to 
draft the reports of the monitored conversations to a judicial 
clerk is equally insufficient.106  The Court noted that, with re-
gard to the “thoroughness,” that:  
[D]ans certaines circonstances, il soit excessif, ne serait-ce que 
d'un point de vue pratique, de transcrire et de verser au dossier 
d'instruction d'une affaire la totalité des conversations intercep-
tées à partir d'un poste téléphonique. Cela pourrait certes aller à 
l'encontre d'autres droits, tel, par exemple, le droit au respect de 
la vie privée d'autres personnes qui ont passé des appels à partir 
 
103 Bugallo v. Spain, App. No. 58496/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 30 (2003); Dumi-
tru Popescu, App. No. 71525/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70-73; see Iordachi, App. No. 
25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 30.  
104 Dumitru Popescu, App. No. 71525/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 77 (only availa-
ble in French). 
105 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47. 
106 Bugallo, App. No. 58496/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 30. 
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du poste mis sous écoute. Si tel est le cas, l'intéressé doit néan-
moins se voir offrir la possibilité d'écouter les enregistrements ou 
de contester leur véracité, d'où la nécessité de les garder intacts 
jusqu'à la fin du procès pénal, et, plus généralement, de verser au 
dossier d'instruction les pièces qui lui semblent pertinentes pour 
la défense de ses intérêts.107 
The Court has also given attention to the circumstances in 
which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed, in par-
ticular, where an accused has been discharged by an investi-
gating judge or acquitted by a court.108  
D.   The Keeping of Data 
In the Leander judgment, the ECtHR stated that: 
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of pro-
tecting national security, for the Contracting States to have laws 
granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to col-
lect and store in registers not accessible to the public information 
on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing 
the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of impor-
tance for national security.109 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that private-life considera-
tions may arise once any systematic or permanent record 
comes into existence of such material from the public domain. 
 
107 Dumitru Popescu, App. No. 71525/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78. “[U]nder cer-
tain circumstances, it would be excessive, for one thing from a practical point 
of view, to transcribe and include the totality of intercepted conversations op-
erated from a telephone set  into the preliminary investigation file of a case. 
That could indeed be contrary to other rights, like, for example, the right to 
respect for the private lives of other people who have made calls from the 
monitored set. If that is the case, the person concerned should nevertheless 
be offered the opportunity to listen to the recordings or to challenge their 
truthfulness, hence the necessity to keep them intact until the end of the 
criminal proceedings, and, more in general, to include the pieces that look 
suitable to him for the defense of his interests into the preliminary investiga-
tion file.” Id.  (translated by author). 
108 Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 34 
(1990); Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 35 
(1990); Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
483 ¶ 46 (1999); Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (quoting We-
ber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95 (2006)). 
109 Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶ 59 
(1987). 
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Other than the techniques discussed above, it is not always 
self-evident whether the keeping of data amounts to a privacy 
interference (infra Part 1). Once an interference is established, 
the question is whether it can be justified under Article 8 of the 
ECHR (infra Part 2). 
 1.    The Existence of an Interference 
Nowadays, data can take a multitude of forms: not only 
plain biographic information on an individual’s identity, but al-
so photographic material, video or voice recordings, finger 
prints, DNA or cellular material.  The question is whether the 
gathering of data on a person amounts to an interference with 
Article 8 of the ECHR in all circumstances. 
In the Friedl case, which involved the use of photographs 
taken by the authorities during a public demonstration, the 
European Commission for Human Rights110 noted that there 
was no intrusion into the inner circle of the applicant’s private 
life.111  The photographs were taken of a public demonstration 
and they had been used solely as an aid to police the demon-
stration on the relevant day.112  In this context, the Commis-
sion gave weight to the fact that the photographs taken re-
mained anonymous, the personal data recorded and the 
photographs were not entered into a data-processing system, 
and no action had been taken to identify the persons photo-
graphed on that occasion by means of data processing.113  In 
Lupker, equally concerning photographs, the Commission ob-
served first that they were not taken in a way which consti-
tuted an intrusion upon the applicants’ privacy; second, that 
the photographs were kept in police archives since they had 
been either provided voluntarily or taken by police in connec-
tion with a previous arrest; and third, that the photo’s “were 
 
110 Until the adoption of the 11th Protocol additional to the ECHR indi-
vidual complaints were first assessed by an accessory organ to the Court. It 
was abolished in 1998. 
111 Friedl v. Austria, App. No. 15225/89, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 83 (1995). 
112 Id. ¶ 49. 
113 Id. ¶ 50. 
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used solely for the purpose of the identification of the offenders 
in the criminal proceedings against the applicants and there is 
no suggestion that they have been made available to the gener-
al public or used for any other purpose.”114 
Also, the monitoring of the actions of an individual in a 
public place by the use of photographic equipment which does 
not record the visual data does not, as such, give rise to an in-
terference with the individual’s private life.115  In those cases, 
the question whether privacy was violated was not even asked 
– government action did not amount to a privacy issue. 
The storing and releasing of information from a secret po-
lice file without opportunity to refute it is, however, considered 
an interference.116  Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded 
that recordings taken for use as voice samples could be re-
garded as falling outside the scope of the protection afforded by 
Article 8, since a permanent record has “been made of the per-
son’s voice and it is subject to a process of analysis directly re-
levant to identifying that person in the context of other person-
al data.”117  Equally, a card containing data relating to an 
individual’s private life that is being stored in a national card 
index has been considered an interference.  In that case, the 
Court pointed out that it was not its job to speculate as to 
whether the information gathered is sensitive or not, nor as to 
whether the individual has been inconvenienced in any way.  It 
is sufficient to conclude that where data relating to the private 
life of an individual is stored by a public authority, the measure 
amounted to an interference with Article 8 protection.118 
With regard to fingerprints, the Court reassessed existing 
case-law established in the 2008 landmark case S. and Marper.  
In the past, the Commission concluded that fingerprints were 
neutral, identifying features and therefore did not contain any 
subjective appreciations.  As such, the retention of that materi-
 
114 Lupker v. Netherlands, App. No. 18395/91, Eur. H.R. Rep. (1992). 
115 Herbecq v. Belgium, App No. 32200/96, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 504 (1998).  
116 Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶ 48 
(1987). 
117 P.G. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44787/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 550 ¶ 59 
(2001). 
118 Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 70 (2000). 
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al did not constitute an interference with private life.119  The 
Court now concluded that the general approach with respect to 
photographs and voice samples should also be followed with re-
spect to fingerprints.  Fingerprints objectively contain unique 
information about the individual concerned, allowing for his or 
her identification with precision, in a wide range of circums-
tances.  They are thus capable of affecting private life and re-
tention of this information, without the consent of the individ-
ual concerned, cannot be regarded as neutral or insignificant.  
Accordingly, the Court considered that the retention of finger-
prints in the authorities’ records in connection with an identi-
fied or identifiable individual may in itself give rise, notwith-
standing their objective and irrefutable character, to important 
private-life concerns.120 
Today, in a time when many States across the world tend 
to systematically keep biometrical data on people, the question 
of what status should be given to cellular and DNA material is 
highly important.  With regard to the keeping of that type of 
information, the S. and Marper judgment declared that this 
amounts to an interference with the right to privacy.121 
[A]n individual’s concern about the possible future use of private 
information retained by the authorities is legitimate and relevant 
to a determination of the issue of whether there has been an in-
terference. Indeed, bearing in mind the rapid pace of develop-
ments in the field of genetics and information technology, the 
Court cannot discount the possibility that in the future the pri-
vate-life interests bound up with genetic information may be ad-
versely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be 
anticipated with precision today.122 
The Court noted, however, that a legitimate concern about the 
conceivable use of cellular material in the future is not the only 
element to be taken into account.  In addition to the highly per-
sonal nature of cellular samples, they contain sensitive infor-
 
119 Kinnunen v. Finland, App. No. 24950/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R. (1996). 
120 S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85 (2008).  
121 Id. ¶ 77. 
122 Id. ¶ 71. 
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mation about an individual, including information about his or 
her health, and, moreover, samples contain a unique genetic 
code of great relevance to both the individual and his rela-
tives.123 
DNA profiles contain a more limited amount of personal 
information in a coded form.  Nonetheless, the profiles contain 
substantial amounts of unique personal data.  While that in-
formation may be considered objective and irrefutable, 
processing the data through automated means allows the au-
thorities to go well beyond neutral identification.  “In the 
Court’s view, the DNA profiles’ capacity to provide a means of 
identifying genetic relationships between individuals . . . is in 
itself sufficient to conclude that their retention interferes with 
the right to the private lives of the individuals concerned.”124  
The frequency of familial searches, the safeguards attached 
thereto, and the likelihood of detriment in a particular case 
were found immaterial in this respect.  The conclusion was si-
milarly not affected because the information is in coded form.  
The Court concluded that "[t]he possibility the DNA profiles 
create for inferences to be drawn as to ethnic origin, makes 
their retention all the more sensitive and susceptible of affect-
ing the right to private life."125 
2.     Justifiability of an Interference 
In order to maintain such databases, the conditions of the 
second paragraph of Article 8 will have to be fulfilled; any in-
terference should be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate 
goal, and be necessary in a democratic society.  As stated in the 
Rotaru case (supra), for the measures to be in accordance with 
the law, the Court reiterated: 
[T]hat it is as essential, in this context, as in telephone tapping, 
secret surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering, to have 
clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of 
measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, 
duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for 
 
123 Id. ¶ 72. 
124 Id. ¶¶ 74-75. 
125 Id. ¶ 76. 
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preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and proce-
dures for its destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees 
against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.126 
The fact that the keeping of this information can serve a legi-
timate aim is not an issue.  The Court had no difficulty in ac-
cepting that the compilation and retention of a DNA profile 
serves the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime and the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  This is not al-
tered by the fact that DNA plays no role in the investigation 
and trial of the offences committed by an applicant.  Further-
more, the Court did "not consider it unreasonable for the obli-
gation to undergo DNA testing to be imposed on all persons 
who have been convicted of offences of a certain seriousness."127 
The question remains as to whether it is necessary in a 
democratic society to use DNA collection in certain situations.  
The Court found it to be beyond dispute that the fight against 
crime, and in particular against organized crime and terrorism, 
depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific tech-
niques of investigation and identification; nor is it disputed 
that the Member States have made rapid and marked progress 
in using DNA information in the determination of innocence or 
guilt.128  Furthermore, the applicant may also reap a certain 
benefit from the inclusion of his DNA profile in the national da-
tabase in that he may thereby be rapidly eliminated from the 
list of persons suspected of crimes in the investigation of which 
material containing DNA has been found.129  In the S. and 
Marper case, the Court emphasized nevertheless that it cannot 
limit itself to an assessment in abstracto of the technique:  
While it recognizes the importance of such information in the de-
tection of crime, the Court must delimit the scope of its examina-
tion. The question is not whether the retention of fingerprints, 
cellular samples and DNA profiles may in general be regarded as 
 
126 Id. ¶ 99 (internal citation omitted). 
127 Van der Velden v. Netherlands, App. No. 29514/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1174 
(2006). 
128 S., App. No. 30562/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 105. 
129 Van der Velden, App. No. 29514/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1174 (2006). 
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justified under the Convention. The only issue to be considered 
by the Court is whether the retention of the fingerprint and DNA 
data of the applicants, as persons who had been suspected, but 
not convicted, of certain criminal offences, was justified under ar-
ticle 8, paragraph 2 of the Convention.130 
According to the Court, the core principles of data protection 
require the retention of data to be proportionate in relation to 
the purpose of collection and insist on limited periods of sto-
rage.131  More particularly, most of the Member States allow 
cellular samples to be taken in criminal proceedings only from 
individuals suspected of having committed offenses of a certain 
minimum gravity.  The Court noted that in the great majority 
of the States with functioning DNA databases, samples and 
DNA profiles derived from those samples are required to be 
removed or destroyed either immediately, or within a certain 
limited time after acquittal or discharge, although a restricted 
number of exceptions to this principle is allowed by some 
States.132 
The Court remarked that the protection afforded by Article 
8 of the ECHR would be unacceptably weakened if the use of 
modern scientific techniques in the criminal justice system 
were allowed at any cost.  “In the Court’s view, the strong con-
sensus existing among the [Member] States in this respect is of 
considerable importance and narrows the margin of apprecia-
tion left to the State in the assessment of the permissible limits 
of the interference with private life.”133  This leads one to ask: 
can there be relevant and sufficient reasons for the permanent 
retention of fingerprint and DNA data of all suspected, but not 
convicted, people?  
In S. and Marper, the Court accepted that the extension of 
the database had contributed to the detection and prevention of 
crime, despite the fact that there was no evidence at that time 
establishing that the successful identification and prosecution 
of offenders “could not have been achieved without the perma-
nent and indiscriminate retention of the fingerprint and DNA 
 
130 S., App. No. 30562/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 106. 
131 Id. ¶ 107. 
132 Id. ¶ 108.  
133 Id. ¶ 112. 
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records of all persons in the applicants’ position.”134 The ques-
tion, however, remained whether such retention is proportio-
nate and strikes a fair balance between the competing public 
and private interests.  In this respect, the Court rejects a blan-
ket and indiscriminate power of retention: 
The material may be retained irrespective of the nature or gravi-
ty of the offence with which the individual was originally sus-
pected or of the age of the suspected offender; fingerprints and 
samples may be taken – and retained – from a person of any age, 
arrested in connection with a recordable offence, which includes 
minor or non-imprisonable offences. The retention is not time-
limited; the material is retained indefinitely whatever the nature 
or seriousness of the offence of which the person was suspected. 
Moreover, there exist only limited possibilities for an acquitted 
individual to have the data removed from the nationwide data-
base or the materials destroyed . . .; in particular, there is no pro-
vision for independent review of the justification for the retention 
according to defined criteria, including such factors as the se-
riousness of the offence, previous arrests, the strength of the sus-
picion against the person and any other special circumstances.135 
The Court acknowledged that the level of interference with the 
applicants’ right to private life may be different depending on 
the category of personal data retained.  For example, the reten-
tion of cellular samples is particularly intrusive given the 
wealth of genetic and health information contained therein.  
However, such an indiscriminate and open-ended retention re-
gime as the one in issue called for careful scrutiny regardless of 
these differences.136  The risk of stigmatization, as the Court 
emphasized, is of particular concern.  The perception that per-
sons involved are not being treated as innocent is heightened 
by the fact that data are retained indefinitely in the same way 
as the data of convicted persons, while the data of those who 
have never been suspected of an offense are required to be de-
stroyed.137  The Court finally considered that the retention of 
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the unconvicted persons’ data may be especially harmful in the 
case of minors, given their special situation and the importance 
of their development and integration into society.138  It con-
cluded that “[a]ccordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a 
disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to re-
spect for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society.”139 
V.  SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES INTERFERING WITH 
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
It is clear that the application of certain special investiga-
tion techniques cannot only give cause to violations of an indi-
vidual’s privacy, but it may also touch upon other fundamental 
rights, including the right to a fair trial.  The European Court 
does not accept that Article 6, which guarantees due process, 
has no application to pre-trial proceedings.  Its requirements 
may be relevant before a case is sent for trial, because the fair-
ness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial 
failure to afford such rights.140  Often, the question about the 
admissibility during trial of the information previously ob-
tained, is linked.  The European Court is, in principle, reluc-
tant to make a judgment about particular evidentiary issues 
when examining an alleged violation of Article 6 of the ECHR.  
It holds that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter 
to be regulated by national law, and as a general rule, it is for 
the national courts to assess the evidence before them:  “The 
Court’s task is rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a 
whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were 
fair.”141  Overall, as it will appear, there is a certain leniency 
towards due process restrictions when national security is at 
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stake.  But it is limited, and including within the Court, not 
uncontroversial.  Below, the technique of infiltration (infra 
Part A), and the keeping of observation and infiltration data in 
confidential records (infra Part B), will be discussed more pro-
foundly. 
A.  Infiltration 
For police to perform their task, they are increasingly re-
quired to make use of undercover agents, informers, and covert 
practices, particularly in tackling organized crime and corrup-
tion.  That special investigation technique is essentially of a 
deceptive nature.  The European Court noted in this regard 
that the use of special investigative methods – in particular, 
undercover techniques – cannot in itself infringe the right to a 
fair trial.142  However, on account of the risk of police incite-
ment entailed by such techniques, their use must be kept with-
in clear limits, as will be shown below.  
In the Lüdi case, the Court found, first of all, that the 
sending of an undercover agent into what was thought to be a 
large criminal network did not interfere with the right to pri-
vacy of the suspects.  A suspect who is aware that he is en-
gaged in a criminal act, should equally be aware that he is con-
sequently running the risk of encountering an undercover 
police officer whose task, is in fact, to expose him.143  Regarding 
fair trial rights however, the use of undercover agents must be 
restricted and safeguards put in place. Crucial in Lüdi was the 
determination that the police officer concerned had been sworn 
in, the investigating judge had not been unaware of his mis-
sion, and the authorities had opened a preliminary investiga-
tion.144   
By doing so, the police officers’ role is confined to acting as 
an undercover agent.  The fact that the authorities have “good 
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reason to suspect” the defendant of having a propensity to 
commit an offense would tend to suggest that an operation is 
more akin to “infiltration” than “instigation.”  That was not the 
case in the case of Teixeira de Castro.  As there was no gov-
ernment evidence to support that the applicant was predis-
posed to commit offenses, the Court concluded that “the police 
officers did not confine themselves to investigating Mr. Teixei-
ra de Castro’s criminal activity in an essentially passive man-
ner, but exercised an influence such as to incite the commission 
of the offence.”145 In the Court’s opinion, the right to a fair 
administration of justice holds such a prominent place that it 
cannot be sacrificed for the sake of expedience.146 Following 
the principles established in Teixeira, the Ramanauskas case, 
for example, held that “the public interest cannot justify the 
use of evidence obtained as a result of police incitement, as to 
do so would expose the accused to the risk of being definitively 
deprived of a fair trial from the outset.”147 
In that circumstance, suspicion must be based on concrete 
evidence showing that initial steps have been taken to commit 
the acts constituting the offense for which the defendant is 
subsequently prosecuted.  The Court holds that police officers 
act only as undercover agents if significant steps preparatory to 
the commission of the offense had been taken before their par-
ticipation in the investigation.148  The Court also checks 
“whether there is evidence indicating that, without such inter-
vention, the offence would not have been committed.”149  In any 
event, it is up to the prosecution to prove that there was no in-
citement, provided that the defendant’s allegations are not 
wholly improbable.  In the absence of any such proof, it is the 
task of the judicial authorities to examine the facts of the case 
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and to take the necessary steps to uncover the truth in order to 
determine whether there was any incitement.  For the trial to 
be fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, “all evi-
dence obtained as a result of police incitement must be ex-
cluded.”150 
B.  The Inaccessibility of a Confidential Record 
The confidentiality of records holding information obtained 
through special investigation techniques is obviously a delicate 
matter.  It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial 
that criminal proceedings are adversarial and that there is 
equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense.  The 
right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that 
both parties must have the opportunity to know and comment 
on the evidence discovered.  In addition, Article 6 of the ECHR 
requires that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defense 
all material evidence in their possession for or against the ac-
cused.  However, “the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evi-
dence is not an absolute right. In any criminal proceedings 
there may be competing interests, such as national security or 
the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or to keep se-
cret police methods of investigating crime, which must be 
weighed against the rights of the accused.”151 
In some cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evi-
dence from the defense so as to preserve the fundamental 
rights of another individual or to safeguard an important pub-
lic interest.  Nevertheless, only measures restricting the rights 
of the defense which are strictly necessary are permissible un-
der Article 6.  “[I]n order to ensure that the accused receives a 
fair trial, any difficulties caused to the defence by a limitation 
on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the proce-
dures followed by the judicial authorities.”152 
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The European Court considers that a procedure whereby 
the prosecution itself attempts to assess the importance of con-
cealed information for the defense and weighs this against the 
public interest in keeping the information secret, cannot comp-
ly with the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR.153  It is im-
portant that material relevant to the defense be placed before 
the trial judge for his ruling on questions of disclosure at the 
time when it can serve most effectively to protect the rights of 
the defense.154  In the Jasper case, the Court found that it was 
sufficient that the trial judge, with full knowledge of the issues 
in the trial, carried out the balancing exercise between the pub-
lic interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the evidence, 
and the need of the defendant to have it revealed.  The Court 
was satisfied that the defending party was kept informed and 
permitted to make submissions and participate in the decision-
making process, as far as was possible without revealing to 
them the material which the prosecution sought to keep secret 
on public interest grounds.155  
Similarly, the Court determined in the Rowe and Davis 
case that a procedure before an appellate court about the dis-
closure of information was in itself not necessarily sufficient to 
remedy the unfairness during the trial by the absence of the 
scrutiny of information withheld by the trial judge.156  Appel-
late judges' understanding of the possible relevance of the un-
disclosed material is sometimes dependent upon transcripts of 
hearings, and on the account of the issues given to them by 
prosecution.  The first-instance judge is in a position to monitor 
the need for disclosure throughout the trial, assessing the im-
portance of the undisclosed evidence at a stage when new is-
sues are still emerging.  “In contrast, the Court of Appeal was 
obliged to carry out its appraisal ex post facto.”157 
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In the Edwards and Lewis case however, the Court drew 
the opposite conclusion with regard to the capacity of the trial 
judge.  It appeared to the Court that the undisclosed evidence 
related, or might have related, to an issue of fact decided by the 
trial judge (the applicants alleged that they had been the vic-
tim of police incitement).158  As they were denied access, it was 
impossible for the defense representatives to argue the case in 
full.  The judge had already seen prosecution evidence which 
might have been relevant to the issue: it was the same judge 
that had to assess the necessity of secrecy who judged the case 
on the merits afterwards.  His appraisal of the evidence was 
essential to determine whether the prosecution could continue, 
and whether not disclosing it to the defense violated their right 
to a fair trial.159 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although it may be clear that striking a balance between 
national security and privacy interests of individual citizens is 
not an easy exercise, the European Court of Human Rights 
considers the efforts of Member States of the Council of Europe 
to live up to a number of principles particularly important.  
The Court’s conclusions on the merits in all the above men-
tioned cases insisted on legal certainty; continuous control by 
independent (judicial) actors; a subsidiary deployment of very 
invasive measures for the benefit of others; less intrusive tech-
niques; and proportionality of the interference with one’s priva-
cy or due process rights to the goals government seeks to de-
fend.  Particularly the latter condition may stay the pivotal 
point in the Court’s decision-making for many years to come, as 
the proportionality requirement is a primary criterion in de-
termining whether human rights interference can be consi-
dered “necessary in a democratic society.”  That is not all self-
evident. Some of the junior Member States in Eastern Europe 
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have had an authoritarian regime for decades. Many of the 
cases discussed above show that often, their legal system is 
still adapting to the democratic standards set out by the Coun-
cil of Europe.160 Nevertheless, no senior Member should as-
sume that its intelligence framework is perfect as is. 
It can be expected that in 21st century democracies, privacy 
issues will remain a prominent legal issue.  In contrast to ques-
tions of privacy concerning what we do while at work, on the 
internet or within our homes, when confronted with national 
security issues, it may be tempting to conclude that intrusive 
government measures should be allowed, since the greater good 
concerns our collective safety.  Nevertheless, there is no reason 
why severe privacy deprivation should ever be considered self-
evident.  Even though the problem seems pre-eminently a mat-
ter of modern times, in 1759, in a time when nation-states were 
under full construction, Benjamin Franklin wrote a wisdom 
that has clearly passed the test of time: “Those who would give 
up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, de-
serve neither liberty nor safety.”161 We may want to keep this 
in mind. 
 
 
 
160 On 31 December 2009, 28.1% of pending cases before the Court were 
cases against Russia, 8.4% against Ukraine, and 8.2% against Romania; 
54.9% of all pending cases originated in only 6 of 46 Member States, all for-
mer dictatorships. See Analysis of Statistics 2009 of the Court (published 
January 2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/89A5AF7D-
83D4-4A7B-8B91 6F4FA11AE51D/0/Analysis_of_statistics2009.pdf. 
161 Benjamin Franklin, Remarks on the Proposition, in 1 MEMOIRS OF THE 
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 270 (1818). 
